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I. INTRODUCTION
Legislation by statute or state constitutional amendment prohibiting
the application in state courts of an ill defined "Shariah Law" and/or
"international law" has passed or is in the process in over twenty states.'
* Robert E. Michael is the Chair of the Islamic Law Committee of the American Branch of
the International Law Association (ABILA), the Chair of the Subcommittee on Islamic Law of the
Council on International Affairs of the New York City Bar Association (NYCBA), and former Chair of
the NYCBA Committee on Foreign and Comparative Law. He also teaches international L.L.M
students Corporate Finance as an Adjunct Professor of Law at Pace University Law School; and is the
Managing Member of Robert E. Michael & Associates PLLC, which specializes in cross-border
bankruptcy matters. Mr. Michael represented both the NYCBA and the Islamic Law Committee of
ABILA in filing an amicus curiae brief in the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals supporting the preliminary
injunction issued in Awad v. Ziriax concerning the "Save Our State" amendment to the Oklahoma State
Constitution.
Mr. Michael thanks the NYCBA for permitting the extended use of The Unconstitutionality of
Oklahoma Referendum 755 - The "Save Our State Amendment," Report of its Committee on Foreign
and Comparative Law (December 2010), http://www2.nycbar.org/Publications/reports/
reportsbycom.php?com=62, of which he was the principal author.
I. See, e.g., Aaron Fellmeth, International Law and Foreign Laws in the US. State
Legislatures, AM. SOC'Y OF INT'L L. INSIGHTS (Vol. 15, Iss. 13, May 26, 2011) ("Beginning in 2010,
legislators in half of the U.S. states proposed-and in two states adopted-a series of bills or state
constitutional amendments designed to restrict the use of international law and foreign laws by state
(and sometimes federal) courts.").
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The expressed purpose is usually to oppose the infiltration of terrorist
Islamic groups bent upon creating a worldwide Caliphate in the United
States (U.S.) through the imposition of Islamic law.2 Is this
unconstitutional racism cloaked as national security or a proper response to
modem asymmetric warfare?
On one side, there are those, and I admit to being in this camp, who
believe this legislative effort is a misguided and uninformed, at best,
movement of American domestic politics aimed at imposing an isolationist
and harshly unconstitutional reactionary view of the Rule of Law; with the
sheep's clothes here being homeland security.3 There is, after all, a
sweeping array of principles of common law, international law, natural law
and U.S. Constitutional law, to name the most obvious, which permit, or
even require, U.S. courts to consider whether, for example, a will is
properly subject to admission to probate if it provides that all distributions
should be made in accordance with the distribution rights provided for by
the Maliki School of Law as followed in Morocco.4 Equally importantly, as
part of that judicial consideration it would be necessary for any such court
to determine that the application of such choice of law would not result in
the violation of any legal right of any party before it, or of any applicable
Federal or National law or public policy.5  In other words, that this
application of a tenet of law derived from classical Islamic law would be in
no way different from the application of any choice of foreign law, whether
French, Russian or Botswanan; or Catholic Canonical, Protestant
Ecclesiastical, Jewish, or Hindu law-with the possible exception of any
law which the United States is bound to apply by treaty.6 To do otherwise,
simply because the underlying source is a religion some of whose
practitioners are leading or pursuing a political and/or military opposition to
this country-is hard to differentiate legally from the internment of
2. Asma Uddin, Caliphate on the Range? The Shariah Precedent in American Courts,
HUFFINGTON POST, Nov. 6, 2010, available at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/asma-uddin/caliphate-
on-the-rangeb_778207.html (last visited Feb. 29, 2012).
3. Bill Gertz, Shariah a Danger to US., Security Pros Say, WASH. TIMES, Sept. 14, 2010,
available at http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2010/sep/14/shariah-a-danger-to-us-security-pros-
say/?page-all (last visited Feb. 29, 2012).
4. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 734.104 (2011) for a statute that requires admission of a will that is
valid in another jurisdiction. ((2) A petition to admit a foreign will to record may be filed by any person
and shall be accompanied by authenticated copies of the foreign will, the petition for probate, and the
order admitting the will to probate. . . . (4) When admitted to record, the foreign will shall be as valid
and effectual to pass title to real property and any right, title, or interest therein as if the will had been
admitted to probate in this state.)
5. See discussion infra of the Due Process Clause.
6. See discussion infra of the Supremacy Clause.
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Japanese-Americans during World War II because the country of their
forebears was at war with us.
The other view is perhaps most cogently expressed in a very
thoughtful and well-researched jeremiad from the Center for Security
Policy, an organization whose members include at least one former Director
of the CIA, and forthrightly entitled "Shariah-The Threat to America."7
As stated in a key portion of its opening section:
Those who today support shariah and the establishment of a
global Islamic state (caliphate) are perforce supporting objectives
that are incompatible with the U.S. Constitution, the civil rights
the Constitution guarantees and the representative, accountable
government it authorizes. In fact, shariah's pursuit in the United
States is tantamount to sedition.8
Whether pursued through the violent form of jihad (holy war) or
stealthier practices that shariah Islamists often refer to as "dawa"
(the "call to Islam"), shariah rejects fundamental premises of
American society and values:
a) The bedrock proposition that the governed have a right to
make law for themselves;
b) The republican democracy governed by the Constitution;
c) Freedom of conscience; individual liberty (including in
matters of personal privacy and sexual preference);
d) Freedom of expression (including the liberty to analyze and
criticize shariah);
e) Economic liberty (including private property);
f) Equal treatment under the law (including that of men and
women, and of Muslims and non-Muslims);
g) Freedom from cruel and unusual punishments; an
unequivocal condemnation of terrorism (i.e., one that is
based on a common sense meaning of the term and does not
rationalize barbarity as legitimate "resistance"); and
h) An abiding commitment to deflate and resolve political
controversies by the ordinary mechanisms of federalism
and democracy, not wanton violence.9
The subversion campaign known as "civilization jihad" must not
be confused with, or tolerated as, a constitutionally protected
form of religious practice. Its ambitions transcend what
American law recognizes as the sacrosanct realm of private
7. WILLIAM G. "JERRY" BROYKIN ET AL., SHARIA THE THREAT TO AMERICA 6 (Center for
Security Policy Press, 2010) [hereinafter THE THREAT].
8. Id.
9. Id. at 6-7
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conscience and belief. It seeks to supplant our Constitution with
its own totalitarian framework.10
However, if you read the above passage from The Threat closely, you
see that this is in a critical way classic advocacy legerdemain, since the
introductory major premise of the syllogism is a logical duality: "those
who today support shariah and the establishment of a global Islamic state
(caliphate). . . .""
In other words, simply supporting the occasional, and by all accounts
extremely infrequent,12 use of Islamic law precepts in American court cases
by itself is not enough to be culpable of undermining the Constitution.
However, the two are conflated into sedition-a theme that then runs
throughout the remainder of The Threat.13
The explanation is simple. Whether it is the condemnation of business
transactions that are designed to not violate rules based upon Islamic
religious beliefs-notably the prohibitions of interest (riba) and
unquantified risk and speculation (gharar), as described in the Appendix
attached to The Threat 14 -or the application of any aspect of law that
conforms to the system developed in the Islamic world from the early
Seventh Century through about the year 1400, as prohibited by Oklahoma's
"Save Our State" Amendment," it is the unwarranted joining of
unequivocally benign financial and legal principles with practices that are
equally unequivocally medieval (and much older), and in many ways
reprehensible by Western Post-Enlightenment standards, that is the
manifest error of The Threat and the many much less well-presented
arguments of the proponents of the Anti-Shari'a movement. As the old law
school maxim says, your freedom to swing your arms around wildly ends
when they approach my nose.' 6 So it is with fundamentalist Islam. The
rights and freedoms of believers of any religion, lodge, social club, cult or
New Age ersatz philosopher in the United States is as absolute and
10. Id. at 7.
11. Id.
12. See generally AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, NOTHING TO FEAR: DEBUNKING THE
MYTHICAL "SHARIA THREAT" TO OUR JUDICIAL SYSTEM (2011), available at
http://www.aclu.org/religion-belief/nothing-fear-debunking-mythical-sharia-threat-our-judicial-system
(last visited Feb. 29, 2012).
13. THE THREAT, supra note 7, at 8.
14. E.g. SHARIAH FINANCE WATCH I EXPOSING THE RISKS OF SHARIAH FINANCE available at
http://www.shariahfinancewatch.org/blog/(last visited Feb. 29, 2012).
15. Enrolled H.R.J. 1056, 52d Leg. (Okla. 2010).
16. Zechariah Chafee, Freedom ofSpeech in Wartime, 32 HARV. L. REV. 932, 957 (1919).
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unfettered as any other citizen's-as long as not exercised to violate the
very same laws that apply to everyone else.
However, this nuance seems to have escaped the draftspersons of the
more than twenty proposed statutes and constitutional amendments that
seek to prohibit the use of "Shariah Law" throughout the United States.'7
At present, the most important such omission is in the Oklahoma "Save Our
State" Amendment to its Constitution, that was approved in a referendum
last November by over a 70% vote (would you vote AGAINST Saving
Your State?).' 8
Technically, the voters approved a Referendum Question 9 (Question
755) to add the "Save Our State Amendment." 20  Once certified by the
Oklahoma Board of Elections, the Amendment would prohibit Oklahoma
courts from considering or using both "international law" and "Sharia
Law." The U.S. District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma, per
Vicki Miles-LaGrange, Chief Judge, issued a preliminary injunction barring
certification of the referendum, based on its finding of the likelihood of
success on the merits of the argument that allowing such certification would
necessarily lead to violations of the Establishment and Free Exercise
Clauses of the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.2' As of this
17. Jamilah King, 13 States Introduces Useless Bills to Ban Sharia Law, COLORLINES, Feb. 9
2011, available at http://colorlines.com/archives/2011/02/13_states-introduce-bills-to-ban_
sharialaw.html (last visited March 7, 2012).
18. Oklahoma Ban On Islamic Law Unconstitutional, HUFFINGTON POST, Jan. 1, 2012,
available at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/01/1 0/court-ban-on-islamic-law-oklahoma n
I 197193.html (last visited Feb. 19, 2012).
19. State Question No. 755, Enrolled H.R.J. 1056, 52nd Leg. (Okla. 2010):
Courts to rely on federal and state laws when deciding cases forbidding courts
from looking at international law or Sharia Law. This measure amends the State
Constitution. It changes a section that deals with the courts of this state. It would
amend Article 7, Section 1. It makes courts rely on federal and state law when
deciding cases. It forbids courts from considering or using international law. It
forbids courts from considering or using Sharia Law. International law is also
known as the law of nations. It deals with the conduct of international
organizations and independent nations, such as countries, states and tribes. It
deals with their relationship with each other. It also deals with some of their
relationships with persons. The law of nations is formed by the general assent of
civilized nations. Sources of international law also include international
agreements, as well as treaties. Sharia Law is Islamic law. It is based on two
principal sources, the Koran and the teaching of Mohammed.
Available at https://www.sos.ok.gov/gov/questions.aspx (last visited Feb. 19, 2012).
20. Id.
21. Awadv. Ziriax, 754 F.Supp.2d 1298 (W.D. Okla 2010).
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writing, the appeal thereof by the State of Oklahoma is pending before the
United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.22
While not addressed in the arguments or the decision with respect to
the preliminary injunction proceedings, it also seems clear beyond doubt
that the implementation of Question 755 would violate not only the
Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses, but also the Supremacy Clause of
Article VI, the Full Faith and Credit Clause of Article IV, the Contracts
Clause of Article I, and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Furthermore, it seems unquestionable that the Save Our State
Amendment is discriminatory, counterproductive, and will make
conducting business and personal affairs more difficult for not only people
who may choose to observe rules or principles based upon Shari'a,23 but for
all who have personal or business relationships with those people, including
the more than 1.6 billion Muslims worldwide.24 As drafted, Question 755
will also needlessly reject the use of the law of other states by Oklahoma
courts even in cases with no relation to "Sharia law."25 Finally, Question
755's prohibition against consideration of "international law" will confuse
and complicate legal matters in Oklahoma for all those whose personal and
business affairs relate to international trade or other private or commercial
dealings with entities in other countries. After all, in our globally
connected world, many of us have foreign and international involvements
we may even be entirely unaware of, including the entity that may
indirectly control our own business or hold our mortgage. No state should
so disadvantage its entire population, and denigrate a segment of its
population that is entitled to the full protection of U.S. and state law.
II. THE FIRST AMENDMENT'S ESTABLISHMENT AND FREE EXERCISE
CLAUSES
The District Court's decision to issue a preliminary injunction was
based on a First Amendment challenge to Question 755. The First
Amendment of the Federal Constitution provides that "Congress shall make
no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
22. Subsequently, the Tenth Circuit upheld the preliminary injunction, relying exclusively, as
did the lower court, on First Amendment grounds. Awadv. Ziriax, No. 10-6273, 2012 WL 50636 (10th
Cir. Jan. 10, 2012).
23. As discussed below, the term "Sharia Law" is either inaccurate or a tautology. The
Shari'a or Shariah, the preferred transliterations from Arabic, includes both law (flqh, in Arabic),
jurisprudence (usul al-fiqh), and moral and religious tenets that are generally not part of civil or criminal
codes in either the common law or civil law jurisdictions that are not theocracies.
24. PEw RESEARCH CENTER, THE FUTURE OF THE GLOBAL MUSLIM POPULATION 13 (2011).
25. Enrolled H.R.J. 1056, 52d Leg. (Okla. 2010).
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exercise thereof."2 6  The District Court found that the plaintiff made a
"strong showing of a substantial likelihood of success" in demonstrating
that Question 755 violates both the Establishment and Free Exercise
Clauses of the First Amendment.27 The Court held that Question 755's
language singles out Sharia Law, "conveying a message of disapproval of
the plaintiffs faith." 2 8 Question 755 would not only bar Oklahoma courts
from considering "Sharia Law," but would allow Oklahoma courts to use or
consider the law of any other state only if "the other state does not include
Sharia Law."2 9
The Court correctly noted that "Sharia Law" to a substantial extent
"lacks a legal character" and rather comprises religious traditions that
"provide guidance to plaintiff and other Muslims regarding the exercise of
their faith."3 0 The Court therefore found that a prohibition on "Sharia Law"
has the effect of inhibiting plaintiff's religion.
The singling out of the law of one religion for prohibition similarly
violates the Free Exercise Clause.32 The plaintiff s will could not be fully
probated in Oklahoma if Question 755 were to become law, the Court
noted, because the will "incorporates by reference specific elements of
Islamic prophetic traditions."3 The court also said that Muslims would "be
unable to bring actions in Oklahoma state courts for violations of the
Oklahoma Religious Freedom Act and for violations of their rights under
the United States Constitution if those violations are based upon their
religion."34
Question 755 is clearly designed to inhibit, and would have the effect
of inhibiting, members of a particular religion from utilizing or relying on
any aspect of the religious law and tradition that underpins their faith if
there is a possibility that such an action would eventually be a part of a case
26. While the First Amendment speaks only about Federal law, it is well-established that the
Fourteenth Amendment extends its prohibition to State Governments. See, e.g., W Va. St. Bd. ofEduc.
v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943); Elrod, Sheriffv. Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976).
27. Awadv. Ziriax, at 1306, 1307.
28. Id. at 1306.
29. Enrolled H.R.J. 1056, 52d Leg. (Okla. 2010).
30. Awad, 754 Fed. Supp. 2d at 1306.
31. U.S. CONST. amend. 1.
32. Church ofthe Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City offHialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 532 (1993).
33. Robert Boczkiewicz, Oklahoma seeks to reinstate anti-Sharia measure, HUFFINGTON
POST (Sept. 12, 2011), available at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/09/12/oklahoma-seeks-to-
reinsta_n_960707.html (last visited Feb. 29, 2012).
34. Awad, 745 Fed. Supp. 2d at 1307.
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in the Oklahoma courts.35  No other religion would be subject to this
stricture, and I am not aware of any other religion having been
(successfully legally) so burdened since the founding of this country.
Question 755 clearly tramples on the religious freedom of individuals who
have the full right to conduct their lives in Oklahoma free from that
interference.
Though the District Court case was brought on First Amendment
grounds and focused on the prohibition relating to "Sharia Law," as noted
above, there are other grounds upon which to find Question 755
unconstitutional both with regard to its treatment of Islamic law and
international law. These are the issues that were addressed by the Amicus
Curiae Brief in Support of Plaintiff-Appellee Submitted by the Association
of the Bar of the City of New York and the Islamic Law Committee of the
American Branch of the International Law Association filed in the 10th
Circuit Appeal.37
III. THE SUPREMACY CLAUSE
While there is an ongoing dispute in the highest levels of judicial and
academic thought as to the proper use of non-U.S. law in U.S. courts, as
exemplified in the conflicting opinions in Roper v. Simmons,38 Question
755 is not framed to reflect the bona fide issues of such dispute. The
critical distinction it ignores is that between "foreign law" and
"international law." Question 755 expressly prohibits the use or
35. Enrolled H.R.J. 1056, 52d Leg. (Okla. 2010).
36. Id.
37. Brief for the Assn'n of the Bar of the City of New York et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Plaintiff-Appelle, Awad v. Ziriax, No. 10-6273, 2012 WL 50636 (10th Cir. Jan. 10, 2012) [hereinafter
New York City Bar Brief].
38. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005). In Roper, the Court, per Justice Kennedy, over a
strong dissent by Justice Scalia, held it was a violation of the Eighth Amendment to execute an offender
who was under eighteen years old at the time he committed a capital crime. Justice Kennedy reasoned
that the Court had, at least since its decision in Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958), referred to the law of
other countries and international authorities as "instructive" for its interpretation of the Eighth
Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment. Justice Kennedy also looked to Article 37
of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, and the fact that only seven countries in
the world, other than the United States, executed juvenile offenders. However, Justice Scalia accused
the majority of asserting that American law should conform to the laws of the rest of the world. He
pointed out that many fundamental principles of Constitutional law, such as the Exclusionary Rule,
have, in fact, been rejected by courts of other countries. He also pointedly accused the majority of the
"sophistry" of relying on foreign law when it suits it, but rejecting it in other instances when it does not.
Roper, 543 U.S. at 627.
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consideration of "international law" and "Sharia Law."3 In addition, the
full Amendment language precedes that with a more general prohibition
that "[t]he courts shall not look to the legal precepts of other nations or
cultures."40 Notwithstanding this language, the official pronouncements by
the Attorney General and Governor of Oklahoma that explain Question 755
ignore the general statement and focus exclusively on "international law"
and "Sharia Law."4' The Attorney General's letter to the Oklahoma
Legislature claimed to have corrected the inadequacies of the Enrolled
House Joint Resolution and produced the final language used in the
official referendum Ballot:42
International law is also known as the law of nations. It deals
with the conduct of international organizations and independent
nations, such as countries, states and tribes. It deals with their
relationship with each other. It also deals with some of their
relationships with persons. . . . The law of nations is formed by
the general assent of civilized nations. Sources of international
law also include international agreements, as well as treaties. 43
This exposition seems to ignore the explicit reference to "legal
precepts of other nations," which must be understood to be foreign law.
Foreign law is simply the law in effect in non-U.S. jurisdictions, including:
a) Foreign legislation;
b) Jurisprudential law of the highest courts of the country
concerned, and/or lower courts, if lower court decisions are
considered significant or there is an absence of
jurisprudential law from the court of last resort of the
country concerned;
c) Law as interpreted by the multinational tribunals of which
the United States is NOT a party, such as the European
Court of Justice; and
d) International conventions to which the United States is
NOT a party to the extent those conventions are
39. Enrolled H.R.J. 1056, 52d Leg. (Okla. 2010).
40. ATTORNEY GENERAL OF OKLAHOMA, LETTER APPROVING QUESTION 755 (June 24,2010).
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. GOVERNOR OF OKLAHOMA, EXECUTIVE PROCLAMATION APPROVING QUESTION 755 (Aug.
10,2010).
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incorporated into domestic law of a foreign nation or
interpreted or construed by the courts of foreign nations.4
If the Question 755 prohibition only covered the general statement in
the Amendment about "legal precepts of other nations" and did not refer to
"international law," it could arguably be construed to apply only to foreign
law. In that event, its repugnance to the Constitution might be limited to 1)
the issue of the ambit of the Contracts Clause to choice of foreign law
provisions, as discussed below; and 2) finite Supremacy Clause4 5 issues
with respect to those relatively few treaties that require U.S. courts to give
effect to foreign law judgments and arbitral awards.46 Since there is a wide
and longstanding body of law that imposes limits on exactly those foreign
law obligations, primarily over due process and other public policy
concerns,4 7 by itself it might not be patently unconstitutional. However,
neither the proposed Amendment nor, a fortiori, Question 755 permit any
such interpretation. As noted above, the official explanatory text
unambiguously defines "international law" explicitly as the "law of
nations" and expressly identifies "treaties" as a principal source thereof.48
Thus, Question 755 expressly includes treaties within the scope of
"international law" that Oklahoma courts are barred from considering or
44. Notable among these would be the European Union treaties that are interwoven throughout
the legal systems of the Member States of the European Union, in particular the Consolidated Version of
the Treaty on European Union (a.k.a. Treaty of Maastricht), 2010 O.J. (C 83) 13 and Consolidated
Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, 2010 O.J. (C 83) 47, available at
http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2010:083:0013:0046:EN:PDF
[Hereinafter EU Treaties] (last visited Feb. 29, 2012).
45. U.S. CONsT. art. VI, §1, cl. 2.
[t]his Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in
Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the
Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or
Laws of any state to the Contrary notwithstanding.
(emphasis added).
46. Carlos Manuel Velazquez, Treaties as the Law of the Land: The Supremacy Clause and
the Judicial Enforcement of Treaties, 122 HARV. L. REV. 599, 601 (2008).
47. See, e.g., Small v. US., 544 U.S. 385 (2005) (Court refused to consider conviction by
Japanese court as within the phrase "convicted in any court" in a Congressional Statute); Societe
Internationale Pour Participations Industrielles et Commerciales v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197 (1958)
(failure of company to produce records for fear of violating foreign law was insufficient basis for non-
production as such a result would undermine the policy behind the Trading with the Enemy Act).
48. Enrolled H.R.J. 1056, 52d Leg. (Okla. 2010).
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using.49 However, treaties are expressly made "the supreme Law of the
Land" by Article VI, Section 1, Clause 2 of the Federal Constitution.
The United States is party to many treaties that have impact
domestically.so A strong example of the immediate conflict between a
treaty and Oklahoma law, should Question 755 become law, is the United
Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods
(CISG)." CISG, art. I differentiates it from all other treaties establishing
obligations between or among states:
1) This Convention applies to contracts of sale of goods
between parties whose places of business are in different
States:
a) When the States are Contracting States; or
b) When the rules of private international law lead to the
application of the law of a Contracting State.52
Therefore, by its terms, the CISG applies directly to all of the citizens and
residents of Oklahoma who enter into contracts for the sale or purchase of
goods with a party in another Contracting State-which includes such
likely trading partners as Canada, Mexico, and China.53  In addition, the
CISG's application is mandatory unless the parties expressly opt out of it.5 4
Accordingly, any and all disputes between, for example, an Oklahoma
purchaser of goods and a supplier from Mexico, brought in an Oklahoma
Court, would be required by the Supremacy Clause to apply the CISG-a
quintessential part of "international law."
Therefore, it is inescapable that Question 755, if it becomes law in
Oklahoma, would constitute a violation and direct affront to the Supremacy
Clause.
49. GOVERNOR OF OKLAHOMA, EXECUTIVE PROCLAMATION APPROVING QUESTION 755 (Aug.
10, 2010).
50. See generally the U.S. Department of State website listing all the treaties to which the
United States is a member, available at http://www.state.gov/s//treaty/ (last visited Feb. 29, 2012).
51. See Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG), Apr. 11, 1980,
1489 U.N.T.S. 3, available at http://www.uncitral.orgluncitrallen/uncitraltexts/salegoods
/1980CISG.html (last visited Feb. 29, 2012).
52. Id. art. I.
53. See Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG) list of partners,
Apr. 11, 1980, 1489 U.N.T.S. 3, available at http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral
texts/sale_goods/1980CISGstatus.html (last visited Feb. 29, 2012).
54. CISG, supra note 53, art. IV.
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IV. THE FULL FAITH AND CREDIT CLAUSE
Article IV, §1 of the U.S. Constitution provides that "Full Faith and
Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial
Proceedings of every other State." 5 It is unquestionably one of the
cornerstones of the U.S. Constitution.
The Full Faith and Credit Clause, inter alia, requires that "[a]
judgment entered in one State must be respected in another provided that
the first State had jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter.",7
Accordingly, Question 755 unconstitutionally limits Oklahoma's duty
to give full faith and credit to the judicial decisions of the other states.
Question 755's direction to "uphold and adhere to . . . the law of
another state of the United States" applies only as long as "the law of the
other state does not include Sharia Law." 8 The Full Faith and Credit
Clause does not allow state courts to pick and choose which decisions they
will "uphold" and "adhere to."59 As the Supreme Court held:
Regarding judgments, however, the full faith and credit
obligation is exacting. A final judgment in one State, if rendered
by a court with adjudicatory authority over the subject matter and
persons governed by the judgment, qualifies for recognition
throughout the land. . . . [O]ur decisions support no roving
"public policy exception" to the full faith and credit due
judgments. . . . "[The] Full Faith and Credit Clause ordered
submission . .. even to hostile policies reflected in the judgment
55. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 1.
56. See, e.g., Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 322 (1981) (Stevens, J., concurring)
("The Full Faith and Credit Clause is one of the several provisions in the Federal Constitution designed
to transform the several states from independent sovereignties into a single unified nation."); see also
Baker v. Gen. Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 234 (1998) ("The Full Faith and Credit Clause is one of the
provisions incorporated into the Constitution by the framers for the purpose of transforming an
aggregation of independent, sovereign states into a nation." (quoting Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343,
355 (1948))).
57. Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 421 (1979); Case law does differentiate between the credit
owed to laws (legislative measures and common law) and to judgments. As the Supreme Court said in
Baker, 522 U.S. at 232:
"In numerous cases this Court has held that credit must be given to the judgment
of another state although the forum would not be required to entertain the suit on
which the judgment was founded." The Full Faith and Credit Clause does not
compel "a state to substitute the statutes of other states for its own statutes dealing
with a subject matter concerning which it is competent to legislate."
58. Enrolled H.R.J. 1056, 52d Leg. (Okla. 2010).
59. U.S. CONsT. art. VI, § 1.
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of another State, because the practical operation of the federal
system, which the Constitution designed, demanded it."
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, which is hearing the appeal of
Awad v. Ziriax, has been equally clear and firm. In a case with striking
similarities to the case under appeal, Finstuen v. Crutcher,' the Tenth
Circuit applied the Full Faith and Credit Clause to hold unconstitutional an
Oklahoma statute that prohibited Oklahoma courts from enforcing out-of-
state adoption decrees in favor of same sex couples.62 The Court noted that
the statute at issue in Finstuen "is a state statute providing for categorical
non-recognition of a class of adoption decrees from other states."'
"Categorical non-recognition" is also a perfect description of the offending
clause of Question 755.
Question 755's plain text brooks only two possible interpretations,
both clearly unconstitutional. The literal reading compels the conclusion
that Oklahoma courts may never "uphold" or "adhere" to the law of another
state, if that state has ever used "Sharia Law" either in a judicial decision or
explicitly or implicitly in legislation (e.g., requiring public schools or
prisons to provide for religious dietary rules in their cafeterias). 4 However,
even the more restrictive interpretation of Question 755 would be that
Oklahoma courts are not empowered to enforce a judgment duly entered in
another state if the decision in question is based in any way on an
application or inspection of the rules or requirements of a Muslim's
religious beliefs. Even the latter is unquestionably within the purview of
the holdings in Baker and Finstuen.
Question 755 therefore is a patent violation of the mandatory
provisions of the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the U.S. Constitution.
V. THE CONTRACTS CLAUSE
Article I, §10 of the U.S. Constitution states: "No State shall ...
pass any . . . [1]aw impairing the Obligation of Contracts." This
elevation of the freedom of private parties to contract to a constitutionally
protected right obviously includes the right to choose what law governs the
60. Baker, 522 U.S. at 233.
61. Finstuen v. Crutcher, 496 F.3d 1139 (10th Cir. 2007).
62. Id.atll41.
63. Id. at 1156.
64. Enrolled H.R.J. 1056, 52d Leg. (Okla. 2010).
65. US Const. Art. I, §10, Cl. 1.
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contract. This raises two issues under Question 755: 1) whether contracts,
which choose to apply "Sharia," are valid, and 2) the impact on choice of
law clauses that choose the law of foreign nations whose law includes
international law.6'
It is indisputable that a substantial portion of contracts entered into in
the United States, and presumably also in Oklahoma, contain choice-of-law
clauses that provide that interpretation of the contract will be governed by
the law of a particular state, foreign country or international convention.68
It is also indisputable that it is customary for contracts to contain choice-of-
forum or mandatory arbitration clauses in which parties agree to submit
disputes under the contracts to a particular federal, state or foreign forum or
to arbitration.69
Furthermore, it is not uncommon in religiously observant
communities for its members to wish to have their internal disputes,
primarily but not exclusively familial and matrimonial, governed by
religious law and adjudicated by a religious tribunal.70 While on its face
Question 755 does not apply to religious courts, since they are not
enumerated in the Oklahoma Constitution as Courts of the State, 71 it
66. See, e.g., Educ. Emp. Credit Union v. Mut. Guaranty Corp., 50 F.3d 1432, 1438 (8th Cir.
1995).
67. Enrolled H.R.J. 1056, 52d Leg. (Okla. 2010).
68. E.g., Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws §187 (1971). In pertinent part:
The law of the state chosen by the parties to govern their contractual rights and
duties will be applied . . . unless . . . application of the law of the chosen state
would be contrary to a fundamental policy of a state which has a materially
greater interest than the chosen state in the determination of the particular issue
and which, under the rule of § 188, would be the state of the applicable law in the
absence of an effective choice of law by the parties.
69. E.g., SAMUEL WILLISTON & RICHARD A. LORD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS
§ 15:15 (4th ed. 1993).
70. New York City Bar Brief, supra note 38, at 7.
71. OKLA. CONST. art. VII, § 1. "Courts in which judicial power vested:"
The judicial power of this State shall be vested in the Senate, sitting as a Court of
Impeachment, a Supreme Court, the Court of Criminal Appeals, the Court on the
Judiciary, the State Industrial Court, the Court of Bank Review, the Court of Tax
Review, and such intermediate appellate courts as may be provided by statute
District Courts, and such Boards, Agencies and Commissions created by the
Constitution or established by statute as exercise adjudicative authority or
render decisions in individual proceedings. Provided that the Court of Criminal
Appeals, the State Industrial Court, the Court of Bank Review and the Court of
Tax Review and such Boards, Agencies and Commissions as have been
established by statute shall continue in effect, subject to the power of the
Legislature to change or abolish said Courts, Boards, Agencies, or
Commissions Municipal Courts in cities or incorporated towns shall continue in
certainly would appear to apply to any such dispute brought into a state
court, or any arbitral award sought to be enforced in such a court.72 This
certainly raises freedom of religion issues, but also Contract Clause
concerns.
However, under Question 755 if parties choose the law of any state
that might in some fashion "include Sharia Law," the law of "other nations
or cultures" or "international law or Sharia Law," Oklahoma courts will be
forbidden from interpreting or enforcing the contract in the manner to
which the parties agreed. Similarly, if parties have agreed to a particular
forum that, in its determination of the dispute under the contract, refers to
or enforces the prohibited areas of law, Oklahoma courts will have to
decline to enforce the adjudications of those forums.
Thus, by singling out certain types of law or forums, Question 755
substantially impairs the constitutionally protected freedom parties would
otherwise have to contract as they choose. As the United States Supreme
Court has noted, American courts have allowed substantial intrusion on that
right only when "the State, in justification, [has] a significant and legitimate
public purpose behind the [law] . .. such as the remedying of a broad and
general social or economic problem."75  In its opposition to the Order, the
State has made absolutely no showing to support the proposition that
effect and shall be subject to creation, abolition or alteration by the Legislature by
general laws, but shall be limited in jurisdiction to criminal and traffic proceedings
arising out of infractions of the provisions of ordinances of cities and towns or
of duly adopted regulations authorized by such ordinances.
72. N.Y. CiTy BAR, supra note 72, at 7.
73. Enrolled H.R.J. 1056, 52d Leg. (Okla. 2010).
74. Oklahoma follows the Restatement rule. Courts there normally enforce the parties' choice
of law or forum, unless the results of application of the law are repugnant to Oklahoma's public policy,
a determination that must be made on a case-by-case basis. See, e.g., Oliver v. Omnicare, Inc., 103 P.3d
626, 628 (Okla. Civ. App. Div. 1 2004): The general rule is that a contract will be governed by the laws
of the state where the contract was entered into unless otherwise agreed and unless contrary to the law
or public policy of the state where enforcement of the contract is sought. Telex Corporation v.
Hamilton, 1978 OK 32, 576 P.2d 767; Williams v. Shearson Lehman Brothers, Inc., 1995 OK CIV APP
154, 917 P.2d 998. Because the parties "otherwise agreed" to being governed by Ohio law, the issue
becomes whether its application to the Employment Agreement's non-competition provision would
violate the law or public policy of Oklahoma. As to the general treatment of choice of forum clauses in
Oklahoma courts, see, e.g., Adams v. Bay, Ltd., 60 P.3d 509, 510 (Okla. Civ. App. Div. 3 2002): A
forum selection clause acts as a stipulation wherein the parties ask the court to give effect to their
agreement by declining to exercise its jurisdiction. Absent compelling reasons otherwise, forum
selection clauses are enforceable. Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585 (1991). See also
The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, (1972) (party resisting the forum selection clause must
"clearly show that enforcement would be unreasonable and unjust, or that the clause was invalid for
such reasons as fraud or overreaching").
75. Energy Res. Grp. Inc. v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 459 U.S. 400, 411-12 (1983).
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Oklahoma is dealing with any "general social or economic problem."7 6 In
Energy Reserves, the Supreme Court found that the Kansas Act at issue
qualified, in large part because it was promulgated "in direct response to"
the passage by Congress of the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978.n This
result was the opposite of that reached in the case it relied on, Allied
Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus.7
The Spannaus decision includes a detailed analysis of the historical
precedents and the essential elements of a Contracts Clause violation. Most
significantly:
[A]lthough the absolute language of the Clause must leave room
for "the 'essential attributes of sovereign power,' . . . necessarily
reserved by the States to safeguard the welfare of their citizens," .
. . that power has limits when its exercise effects substantial
modifications of private contracts. Despite the customary
deference courts give to state laws directed to social and
economic problems, "[legislation] adjusting the rights and
responsibilities of contracting parties must be upon reasonable
conditions and of a character appropriate to the public purpose
justifying its adoption."79
It is important to note that any valid concerns reflected in Question
755 as to the importation into Oklahoma jurisprudence by private
contracting parties of precepts accepted in classical Islamic law, assuming,
arguendo, that they were still valid in some Islamic societies, are
unquestionably clearly and fully protected by existing law. A marriage
contract that, for example, allows for polygamy, is no less valid today in
Oklahoma than it would be were Question 755 to become law.so In other
words, any valid, i.e., constitutional, application of Question 755 would be
meaningless.
On the other hand, the adverse impact on constitutional rights of
Question 755 is evident. For example, a hypothetical Oklahoma company
specializing in curing meats may be eager to hire a French marketing
company to market its products to high-end specialty retailers throughout
Europe. After lengthy negotiations, the parties might well agree that
French law will govern their contract but that claims against the Oklahoma
company must be brought in Oklahoma state courts. Under Question 755,
76. New York City Bar Brief, supra note 38.
77. Energy Res. Grp. Inc., 459 U.S. 407, 413.
78. Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, Att'y Gen. ofMinn., 438 U.S. 234 (1978).
79. Id. at 244.
80. Brief for the Ass'n, supra note 78, at 22.
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the Oklahoma courts apparently cannot apply French law since it
constitutes both "the legal precepts of [another] nation" and, based on the
EU Treaties, "international law," thus impairing the obligation of a key
contractual term.81 Further, suppose that the meat curing company is also
eager to sell domestically to members of religious communities that have
special dietary laws. Under Question 755, an Oklahoma court could not
enforce a provision in sales contracts providing that the meat will conform
to all Islamic halal and Jewish kosher restrictions, since the restrictions
would require an Oklahoma court to not only "look to the legal precepts of
other .. . cultures" but also look to "Sharia Law," once again impairing the
contractual obligations of the parties.82 Nor could an Oklahoma court
adjudicate a dispute between that company and an employee it fired over
the employee's alleged breach of an employment agreement that required
83him or her to comply with Muslim dietary rules in handling their products.
It is precisely this kind of unreasonable interference with parties'
contractual expectations that the U.S. Constitution prohibits. It is also the
reason that all of the similar proposed laws are nonsensical-if they are
severe enough to have an impact that exceeds present Constitutional and
other legal protections, they would be UN-constitutional.
VI. THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
Question 755 is patently too vague to be the basis of governmental
action that qualifies as due process of law." This is because it would
deprive the citizens, residents and any others with personal and property
rights subject to enforcement in Oklahoma courts with any ability to have
their rights adjudicated in a fair and consistent manner. Due process
requires that a statute "provide a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice
of what is prohibited."8 5 However, Question 755 provides no meaningful
guidance to judges or the public as to what "Sharia Law" is. Due process
mandates that a statute not be "so standardless that it authorizes or
encourages seriously discriminatory enforcement."86 As the District Court
duly pointed out, this issue is not only a matter of contract and personal
property law, as in the probate of a will distributing property, but enters the
81. Hannes Hofineister, Goodbye Euro: Legal Aspects of Withdrawal From the Eurozone, 18
COLUM. J. EUR. L. 111, 122 (2010).
82. Enrolled H.R.J. 1056, 52d Leg. (Okla. 2010).
83. New York City Bar Brief ,Supra note 38.
84. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. In pertinent part: "nor shall any State deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law."
85. United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 304, 128 S.Ct. 1830, 170 L.Ed.2d 650 (2008).
86. Id.
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realm of criminal law when such matters as the violation of the Oklahoma
Religious Freedom Act arise.87
88 isnAs discussed in the District Court decision, there is no judicially
cognizable body of law that is Shari'a. Shari'a literally means the "way" or
the "path," and is a process of ascertaining divine will so as to provide
guidance to Muslims as to conduct that will comply with the divine will.89
Shari'a applies in all aspects of life-whether a commercial transaction, a
divorce settlement or one's relationship with parents and children. 90 It is
the compendium of multiple sources accumulated in various societies and
polities over nearly 1400 years, from at least seven different Islamic legal
subdivisions.9' In practice, it was overlaid with different national laws in
each country in which Muslims lived for the majority of the past 600
years.92 Accordingly, the law under which even a wholly observant Muslim
lives in any country may have some aspect of some version of classical
Islamic law, or Shari'a, but with very few exceptions like the Kingdom of
Saudi Arabia, most, if not all, of the law, that governs his or her life will
be the law of the geographical polity based on some mix of English
common law or French or German civil law.94 In that regard, it is
comparable to Protestant Ecclesiastical, Catholic Canonical, and Jewish
Halakhic law.95  However, unlike Jewish and Christian law, there is not
now, nor has there ever been, either a single authoritative compilation (no
Justinian Code, for example, of Roman law) of Shari'a; nor any judicial or
legislative body with jurisdiction over a majority of Muslims-no Supreme
Court, Cour de Cassation, Privy Council, Papal Curia, or Sanhedrin; nor
any Parliament, Congress, Politburo, College of Cardinals or Synod of
Bishops.
As a legal matter, therefore, there is no such body of law as "Sharia
Law," nor has there been since there has been a United States of America.9 7
In fact, what is properly referred to as Shari'a has not been a true body of
87. Awad, 745 Fed. Supp. 2d at 1307.
88. Id. 1306.
89. See, e.g., N. Calder & M.P. Hooker, Shari'a, in THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ISLAM VOL. IX, at
321-28 (C.E. Bosworth, E. van Donzel, W.P. Heinrichs and G. Lecompte, eds., Leiden: Brill 1997).
90. WAEL B. HALLAQ, SHARI'A: THEORY, PRACTICE, TRANSFORMATIONS ? (2009)
91. New York City Bar Brief supra note 38.
92. Id.




97. New York City Bar Brief ,supra note 38.
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law for over six centuries.98 The official explanatory text of the Referendum
Question describes it as: "Islamic law. It is based on two principal sources,
the Koran and the teaching of Mohammed." That is analogous to saying
that American law is based on the Constitution, the Federalist Papers and the
Judiciary Act of 1789-true, but sufficiently incomplete to be of no use in
determining how to conduct oneself consistent with law today.
While no U.S. court has addressed this precise issue in any reported
opinion, the Court of Appeal in the United Kingdom has ruled on this exact
question in Shamil Bank of Bahrain v. Beximco Pharmaceuticals Ltd.99 As
that court held:
Finally, so far as the "principles of ... Sharia" are concerned, it
was the evidence of both experts that there are indeed areas of
considerable controversy and difficulty arising not only from the
need to translate into propositions of modem law texts which
centuries ago were set out as religious and moral codes, but [also]
because of the existence of a variety of schools of thought with
which the court may have to concern itself in any given case
before reaching a conclusion upon the principle or rule in
dispute. . . . [I]f the Sharia law proviso were sufficient to
incorporate the principles of Sharia law into the parties'
agreements, the defendants would have been likely to succeed.
However, since I would hold that the proviso is plainly
inadequate for that purpose, the validity of the contract and the
defendants' obligations thereunder fall to be decided according to
English law.1m
In the United States, an unpublished opinion in a case involving
hundreds of millions of dollars, and two of the leading experts on Islamic
finance and law in the West, Saudi Basic Industries Corp. v. Mobil Yanbu
Petrochemical Co., Inc.,to' did discuss the difficulties of determining a
provision of Saudi law because of the undefined nature of Islamic law.
Thus, even without controlling precedent in this country, any governmental
prohibition of "Sharia Law" per se should be found to be too vague to be of
any valid application as a matter of due process.
An additional vagueness concern emanates from Question 755's
provision that Oklahoma courts may use or consider the law of another of
98. Id.
99. Beximco Pharm., Ltd. v. Shamil Bank ofBahrain EC, [2004] EWCA (Civ) 19 (Eng.).
100. Id. at [55].
101. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp. v. Mobil Yanbu Petrochemical Co., 2003 WL 22016864 (Del.
2003).
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the United States "provided the law of the other state does not include
Sharia Law." 0 2  How can an Oklahoma court, faced with a question
involving the law of a sister state, determine that another state's law "does
not include Sharia Law," barring that state's passage of a constitutional
amendment similar to Question 755? As all states' law includes statutes,
regulations and judicial decisions and administrative determinations, some
aspect of Shari'a-including as it does traditions Muslims are required to
use to guide the conduct of their entire lives-may well have become
incorporated or suggested in a law, rule, case or administrative action, and
often might not have been labeled Shari'a, or Islamic, at all. In other
words, the necessary and direct conclusion from the clear and express
language of the "Save Our State Amendment" to be added to the Oklahoma
State Constitution by Question 755 is that once any American state adopts
any law that recognizes a Muslim's rights (separately or as part of the rights
of all religious groups) to follow any part of his or her religious obligations
under Shari'a, or arguably even issues a divorce decree which incorporates
a settlement involving a Shari'a tradition, thenceforth and forever more and
for any purpose whatsoever, regardless of whether the Oklahoma case in
point has anything to do with "Sharia Law," all of the Oklahoma courts
would be precluded from looking to the law of that state.103 As noted
above, this is clearly a violation of the Full Faith and Credit Clause, but it
also adds to the violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
VII. PUBLIC POLICY COMMERCIAL CONCERNS
In addition to these constitutional law issues, we must also consider as
a matter of public policy the potentially enormous impact on our
international trade caused by a widespread adoption, or the adoption by
only a single commercially important state, of laws like the Save Our State
Amendment.
As the Supreme Court has warned: "If the United States is to be able
to gain the benefits of international accords and have a role as a trusted
partner in multilateral endeavors, its courts should be most cautious before
interpreting its domestic legislation in such manner as to violate
international agreements."'0 Question 755 would seriously damage the
health of international commerce for parties doing business in Oklahoma
and of Oklahomans engaged in international commerce.
102. New York City Bar Brief, supra note 38, at 9.
103. Id.
104. VimarSegurosy Reaseguros, S.A. v. M/VSky Reefer, 515 U.S. 528, 539 (1995).
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Question 755's turn-away from consideration of other forums' laws
violates the long-recognized principle of international comity and
reciprocity. "We cannot have trade and commerce in world markets and
international waters exclusively on our terms, governed by our laws, and
resolved in our courts."os As the Supreme Court observed more than a
century ago: "The general comity, utility, and convenience of nations have
. . . established a usage among most civilized states, by which the final
judgments of foreign courts of competent jurisdiction are reciprocally
carried into execution."' 06 This principle is also part of the supreme law of
the land.107
Consequently, when Oklahoma (and any other state that passes a
similar law) throws comity aside, it risks its residents' international
business partners reciprocating by disregarding choice of law and forum
agreements that select Oklahoma (or such other state's) law. This stalemate
could cause confusion over legal rights, increased multi-forum litigation,
and even decreased international trade as actors no longer have the certainty
needed to conduct cross-border transactions. Many of our trading partners
have a reciprocity requirement for honoring foreign judgments, including
countries in the Middle East. 08  Customarily, these countries, including
some of the largest exporters of oil to the United States, accept the choice
of U.S. law and U.S. courts in all major contracts.' 09 Since these countries
generally incorporate at least some elements of Shari'a in their law,"o they
could reasonably refuse to accept U.S. law and courts going forward. This
would result in a costly breakdown of the existing mechanism for the
resolution of cross-border trade disputes.
The courts have encouraged respect for choice-of-law and choice-of-
forum clauses as a way to lend certainty to commercial dealings, including
among international parties. As the United States Supreme Court has
stated, the alternative is chaos and, potentially, the breakdown of
international commerce:
A contractual provision specifying in advance the forum in which
disputes shall be litigated and the law to be applied is, therefore,
105. The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 9 (1972); see also Vimar Seguros y
Reaseguros, 515 U.S. at 538.
106. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 166 (1895).
107. 11 U.S.C. § 1508 (2006).
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an almost indispensable precondition to achievement of the
orderliness and predictability essential to any international
business transaction . . . . A parochial refusal by the courts of
one country to enforce an international arbitration agreement
would not only frustrate [orderliness and predictability], but
would invite unseemly and mutually destructive jockeying by the
parties to secure tactical litigation advantages. . . . [T]he dicey
atmosphere of such a legal no-man's-land would surely damage
the fabric of international commerce and trade, and imperil the
willingness and ability of businessmen to enter into international
commercial agreements.' 1'
The Supreme Court is also our supreme arbiter of public policy.
Therefore, it is clear that Question 755 and its copies, clones and
counterparts in other states would violate both the United States
Constitution and essential public policy.
VIII. CONCLUSION
An analysis of the overwhelming legal flaws of Question 755 and the
Anti-Shari'a Movement it represents leads to an inescapable conclusion. At
the heart of American patriotism is support for the Rule of Law. Laws like
this are so patently unconstitutional, and so worthless if framed to be
constitutional, that they simply cannot be justified by any actual, perceived,
or illusory concern for homeland security. Unfortunately, that means they
are not only unconstitutionally discriminatory, but downright un-American
as well.
111. Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 516-17 (1974). See also Mitsubishi Motors
Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 629 (1985); Zapata Off-Shore, 407 U.S. at 13
n.15.
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